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Non-verbal social interaction between humans requires accurate understanding of the
others’ actions. The cognitivist approach suggests that successful interaction depends
on the creation of a shared representation of the task, where the pairing of perceptive
and motor systems of partners allows inclusion of the other’s goal into the overarching
representation. Activity of the Mirror Neurons System (MNS) is thought to be a crucial
mechanism linking two individuals during a joint action through action observation. The
construction of a shared representation of an interaction (i.e., joint action) depends upon
sensorimotor cognitive processes that modulate the ability to adapt in time and space.
We attempted to detect individuals’ behavioral/kinematic change resulting in a global
amelioration of performance for both subjects when a common representation of the
action is built using a repetitive joint action. We asked pairs of subjects to carry out
a simple task where one puts a base in the middle of a table and the other places
a parallelepiped fitting into the base, the crucial manipulation being that participants
switched roles during the experiment. We aimed to show that a full comprehension
of a joint action is not an automatic process. We found that, before switching the
interactional role, the participant initially placing the base orientated it in a way that
led to an uncomfortable action for participants placing the parallelepiped. However,
after switching roles, the action’s kinematics by the participant who places the base
changed in order to facilitate the action of the other. More precisely, our data shows
significant modulation of the base angle in order to ease the completion of the joint
action, highlighting the fact that a shared knowledge of the complete action facilitates
the generation of a common representation. This evidence suggests the ability to
establish an efficient shared representation of a joint action benefits from physically
taking our partner’s perspective because simply observing the actions of others may
not be enough.
Keywords: joint action, kinematics and dynamics, social interactions, reach-to-grasp, motor system
INTRODUCTION
Humans are constantly communicating with their fellows. Of all the great apes, it was only
humans who developed a complex verbal language allowing us to communicate our wishes, our
intentions and our feelings. Leibniz (1765) described language as the mirror of understanding,
a powerful instrument used by an individual to express their own internal processes and to
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describe external objects for others and consequently socially
interact with them. However, social communication is not limited
to just verbal communication. Through their behavior, humans
change their environment, satisfy internal needs, and achieve
personal goals (Lemon, 2008). From our early days as infants,
a large number of our actions are performed in social contexts,
allowing us to develop social skills and the ability to coordinate
with interacting agents. One way to study these behaviors is to
focus on joint actions (Sebanz et al., 2006). Classical orchestras,
collective sports, and ballets are just a few examples of how
people can coordinate their movements to achieve a common
goal. But such actions are not only accomplished by musicians
or those competing in team sports. Simple joint actions are
ubiquitous in our everyday life, such as lifting a heavy table
with another person or shaking hands with a colleague. Social
interactions require dynamic and efficient encoding of others’
gesture and a spatiotemporal synchronization of the individuals
involved (Sebanz et al., 2006). On the question of the mechanisms
of interaction, differing views have been proposed over the
years. For example, Coordination Dynamics have explored
the social influence of one person on another, highlighting a
spontaneous and immediate coordination of their actions while
engaging in interpersonal sensorimotor interactions (see Coey
et al., 2012 for a review). This theory places social cognition
in an embodied-embedded constraint, where social behavior is
defined as self-organized. The brain is dynamically in interaction
with the environment and other natural sytems (Coey et al.,
2012). On the other hand, the most traditional approach of
social cognition is set in a cognitivist framework. Evidence
indicating that action production and action perception rely
on common mechanisms led to the Theory of Event Coding
(Hommel et al., 2001). If perception and action rely on common
codes, it makes the integration of one’s own and co-actor’s
action for joint actions relatively straightforward (bottom-up
processes). On a more top-down perceptive, co-representation
of conspecifics during joint action is thought to be a key
feature to understanding others’ goals and actions (Sebanz et al.,
2006).
One cerebral network suggested to play a role in matching
observed and executed actions is the Mirror Neurons System
(MNS). Since mirror neurons (MN) were discovered more than
20 years ago, we have been able to apply a neuroscientific
approach and a new understanding of social interaction. Initially
discovered in non-human primates (di Pellegrino et al., 1992)
and in humans (Buccino et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004; Mukamel et al., 2010), MN are visuo-motor neurons
located in the premotor cortex and the inferior parietal lobule,
automatically firing during the execution of an action and the
observation of the same action performed by another person.
MNS has been proposed as the fundamental neural mechanism
at the basis of the understanding of others’ actions and successful
non-verbal social interactions (Gallese et al., 2004). The discovery
of MN has given rise to a large number of interpretations
of their potential roles in human cognition: understanding of
action (Rizzolatti et al., 2001), imitation (Gallese, 2003), empathy
(Gallese, 2001, 2003), mind-reading (Gallese and Goldman,
1998), and emergence of language (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998).
In recent years, great progress has been made by investigating
neural processes during interpersonal motor interactions
(Newman-Norlund et al., 2007; Newman-Norlund et al., 2008;
Kokal and Keysers, 2010; Konvalinka et al., 2014; Ménoret
et al., 2014; Sacheli et al., 2015b). These studies brought to light
the recruitment of fronto-parietal networks during interactive
contexts where MN are thought to play a role in the internal
simulation, action prediction and understanding. However,
interpersonal coordination requires both perception and
understanding of our partner’s movements while controlling our
own movements. To explain neural processes in bidirectional
interactions, Hari and Kujala (2009) proposed the “interactive-
loop” model. This model is that a coupling of perceptive and
motor systems of the individuals is necessarily involved during
joint actions in order to form common internal representations.
By their actions and intentions, a person influences and changes
not only their environment but also the movements that the
interactional partner needs to perform in order to interact
smoothly. These modifications modulate the perception of the
environment the other person has had up to this point. That
person reciprocates by influencing the environment in return
by changing external representations on their partner’s brain.
The progressive construction of these “action-perception” loops
is constantly changing and seems to be essential for encoding
social actions and building up a common representation of the
action for all the protagonists involved (Hari and Kujala, 2009).
The enrolment of fronto-parietal networks might therefore allow
the construction of an “interactive loop” to build a common
representation of an action in both protagonists, allowing
successful interactions.
In line with this model, it is our opinion that building
experimental paradigms allowing bidirectional and either
synchronic or diachronic adaption (Tognoli and Kelso, 2015)
involving at least two interacting subjects (Tognoli et al., 2007;
Noy et al., 2011; Konvalinka et al., 2014; Sacheli et al., 2015a;
Moreau and Candidi, 2016), it should be possible to highlight a
common adaptation between participants at a behavioral level. In
our study, we focused on behavior changes during a bidirectional
diachronic joint-action, involving one participant putting a base
in the middle of a table and another participant placing a
parallelepiped into the base’s slot. Crucially, the action of placing
the parallelepiped is more or less facilitated depending on how
the base is oriented on the table (for an equivalent solo action,
see Allami et al., 2008). Our paradigm therefore allows space
for adaptation and gives us objective measures to define the
success of the interaction and the installation of the common
representation. The purpose of the study, set on a cognitivist
approach, is to highlight that full comprehension of a joint
action is not automatic and that the installation of the common
representation is progressive.
We attempted to reveal a behavioral change (placing the base
in a more optimal position) when both individuals had physically
experienced the other partner’s motor task difficulty. Results
indicate that the adaptation to the new task was not automatic
and required a common experience from both participants. We
wish to point out a limit of the maximalist interpretations of the
MNS, according to which this system serves the understanding
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of others action and provide empirical data supporting the
minimalist approach of the representational content of MN
(Pacherie and Dokic, 2006). Although we agree the MNS is
part of basic constituents of action understanding, this system
appeared not sufficient to fully understand actions and apprehend
movement difficulties encountered by the other.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Twenty healthy right-handed subjects (6 males, 14 females;
mean age: 22.9, range : 18–50 years) participated in the Main
experiment and 10 healthy right-handed subjects participated
in the Control Experiment (5 males, 5 females; mean age :
21.2, range : 16–28 years). None of them had any history
of neurological disorder. All participants gave written consent
before the experiment. Participants were familiarized with the
methods prior to the experiment. and an explanation of the
purpose of the study was given at the end of the experiment. The
study was approved by the Ethical Committee CPP Sud-Est II.
Procedure
Main Experiment
The experiment involved a pair of participants: subject 1 (S1)
and subject 2 (S2). In the following, participants will be referred
as S1 or S2 depending on their original role in the experiment
(Condition 1). Subjects were seated face to face on opposite sides
of a 50 cm × 70 cm table. Both subjects were instructed to use
only their thumbs and index fingers to grip and displace the
experimental objects, which were placed on predefined spots: the
cylindrical base located to the right of S1 and the parallelepiped
to the right of S2. The slot of the base and the parallelepiped
were both oriented parallel to the sagittal axis (Figure 1). The
subjects were asked to carry out a simple task: S1 was to move
the base to the center of the table and S2 was to place the
parallelepiped in the slot on the base. Note that the action
performed by S2 is more or less facilitated depending on how
S1 place the base on the table: difficult when the slot in the base
remains parallel to the sagittal axis; easy when it is slightly tilted
to the left. The experiment was divided into three conditions
with instructions given prior to each condition. In Condition 1,
the joint action was repeated 20 times with no other instruction
other than completing the task after a vocal “Go” signal from the
experimenter, which was the same for every trial. In Condition 2,
subject’s roles were interchanged so S1 was in charge of moving
the parallelepiped and S2 the base for 3 trials. Because this second
condition was designed to give the opportunity for participants
to experience the other’s action, data from Condition 2 was not
analyzed. In Condition 3, subjects reverted to their initial roles
(so they were carrying out the same task as in Condition 1) for
another 20 trials. In this final condition, participants were further
instructed to perform the task as fast as possible. During the
whole experiment, participants were not allowed to communicate
their feelings either verbally or by explicit non-verbal utterance.
To ensure the accuracy and well-being of the experiment, an
experimenter continuously stayed next to the table in order
to both control inter-subjects communication and to replace
objects at their correct initial location when required. At no time
were participants encouraged to change their motor behavior
either explicitly or implicitly; they believed the goal was a simple
kinematic study until the end of the experiment.
Control Experiment
In the Control Experiment, the task was explained as in the Main
Experiment but subjects only completed Condition 3 (where the
task was to perform the joint action as fast as possible). This
control served to ascertain that verbal instruction to perform the
task as fast as possible was not sufficient to provoke potential
behavioral changes. A critical point of the Control experiment
was that participants were only assigned to one role; they did not
have the opportunity to experience the other participant’s task.
Movements Recording
The movements of the right arm and hand of both subjects were
recorded by means of an Optotrak Certus camera (manufactured
by Northern Digital Inc, in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada). The
camera was fixed 2 m away from the table. Five markers were
placed on each subject: marker 1 was on the distal extremity of
the thumb, marker 2 on the distal extremity of the index, marker
3 on the metacarpophalangeal joint of the index, marker 4 on the
radial styloid and marker 5 was 3 cm over the radial styloid. The
spatial position of active markers was sampled at 250 Hz with a
spatial precision of 0.1 mm.
Raw data was pre-processed using a second order Butterworth
dual-pass filter (cut-off frequency, 10 Hz). Kinematic parameters
were assessed for each individual movement using Optodisp
software (Optodisp copyright INSERM-CNRS-UCBL, Thévenet
et al., 2001). The movement duration was analyzed and the
velocity peak of the two sub-phases of the movement recorded
(Reach-to-Grasp and Displace). Sub-movements onset and offset
were determined by a sequence of at least eleven increasing
or decreasing points of the wrist marker velocity profiles.
Velocity peak was determined as the maximal value in wrist
marker velocity profiles. The workspace was defined by the
X, Y, Z axes defined by the table surface. The angle between
the fingers markers 1 and 2 of S2 and the sagittal axis
was also analyzed. This angle corresponded to the opposition
axis (Paulignan et al., 1997) an index of movement difficulty
(Frak et al., 2001). Note that the opposition axis is directly
linked to the behavior of the subject that places the slot (S1)
because the opposition axis changes with the orientation of
slot.
Statistical Analyses
Kinematic parameters were determined for each individual trial
and averaged for each participant and condition. Statistical
analysis data was analyzed by using Statsoft Statistica 8. General
Linear Model (GLM) and the Greenhouse–Geisser correction
for non-sphericity was applied when appropriate (Keselman
and Rogan, 1980). Post hoc comparisons were performed
using the Newman–Keuls correction for multiple comparisons
(significance threshold was fixed at p< 0.05).
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the joint action task in Condition 1.
Execution time and Velocity peaks were both analyzed each by
separated 2×2×2 (Condition×Movement× Subject) ANOVAs




The 2 × 2 × 2 (Condition × Movement × Subject) ANOVA
showed a significant main effect of Condition [F(1,8) = 70,824,
p< 0,001], indicating a smaller execution time during Condition
3 compared to Condition 1. There was a significant main effect
of movement [F(1,8) = 111,06, p < 0,001], showing that Reach-
to-Grasp movement was realized faster than Displace and a
significant main effect of subject [F(1,8)= 59,335, p< 0,001] that
showed that S1’s action were executed faster than S2’s. Post hoc
test indicated that S1 execution times were smaller in Condition
3 compared to Condition 1 for both Reach-to-Grasp (p < 0,001)
and Displace (p < 0,001) (see Figure 2A) and that S2 execution
times were smaller in Condition 3 compared to Condition 1 for
both Reach-to-Grasp (p < 0,001) and Displace (p < 0,001) (see
Figure 2B).
Velocity Peaks
The 2 × 2 × 2 (Condition × Movement × Subject) ANOVA
showed a significant main effect of Condition [F(1,8) = 49,339,
p< 0,001], indicating a greater execution speed during Condition
3 compared to Condition 1. A significant main effect of
movement [F(1,8) = 114,47, p < 0,001] showed that Reach-
to-Grasp movement was realized with a smaller speed than
Displace. Post hoc test indicated that S1 velocity peaks were
greater in Condition 3 compared to Condition 1 for both Reach-
to-Grasp (p = 0,006) and Displace (p < 0,001) (see Figure 2C)
and S2 velocity peaks were greater in Condition 3 compared to
Condition 1 for both Reach-to-Grasp (p = 0,002) and Displace
(p< 0,001) (see Figure 2D).
Final Angle
In order to compare the final angles of Condition 1, Condition
2, and Control, we performed a one way ANOVA that showed a
main effect [F(2,6)= 7,7206, p= 0,02]. Post hoc test revealed that
the final angle in Condition 3 was significantly smaller compared
to Condition 1 (p = 0,03) and compared to Control (p = 0,02)
(see Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we developed a diachronic joint action task
that induced behavioral adjustments made by one of the
participants in order to make the task of their partner easier
and consequently improving the common realization of the task
for both participants. The results revealed better performance
(execution time and velocity) in both sub-movements of the
task, Reach-to-Grasp and Displace, for both participants when
common representation of the task was achieved.
Our measurements also highlight a significant change in
the final angle of the cylindrical base between the Condition
1 (before the subjects switched roles) and Condition 3 (after
the subjects switched their roles). According to Allami et al.
(2008), this orientation’s change from the sagittal axis facilitates
the partner Displace sub-movement: the articular tension in the
arm and wrist joints are less extreme in Condition 3 than in
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Execution times (s) of Reach-to-Grasp and Displace S1’s Sub-movement in Conditions 1 and 3. (B) Execution times (s) of Reach-to-Grasp and
Displace S2’s Sub-movement in Conditions 1 and 3. (C) Peak velocity (mm/s) of Reach-to-Grasp and Displace S1’s Sub-movement in Conditions 1 and 3. (D) Peak
velocity (mm/s) of Reach-to-Grasp and Displace S2’s Sub-movement in Conditions 1 and 3. ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Condition 1. This behavioral measurement indicates that the
participant placing the base changed their previous behavior, after
experiencing the partner’s contribution to the joint action.
The results from our statistical analysis reveal an increase
in the performance of the subjects for both sub-movements
during Condition 3. In Condition 3, both subjects were asked
to perform the action as fast as possible. Due to this, one
can assess that the instruction (to perform the task as fast as
possible) is the main contributor to the increase in performance,
rather than changes in the orientation. Because of this, we were
also able to calculate the effect size (Cohen’s d) according to
Fitts’s (1954) law , where the level of difficulty of a movement
is proportional to the amplitude of kinematics values (Ferri
et al., 2011). Thus we compared Cohen’s d values calculated
for velocity peaks for each sub-movement in Condition 1 and
Condition 3 for S2 (the participant placing the parallelepiped).
Cohen’s d value for Reach-to-Grasp sub-movement between
Condition 1 and Condition 3 is 0.76, corresponding to a
medium effect, while Cohen’s d for Displace Sub-movement
between Condition 1 and Condition 3 is 1.38, corresponding to
a large effect (Cohen, 1992). The discrepancy between Cohen’s
d values during the two movements’ phases highlights the
facilitation of S2 Displace sub-movement when S1 (participants
placing the base) changed the orientation of the base. On
the one hand, imposed constrain on movement speed in
Condition 3 improves the kinematics parameters in both sub-
movements but on the other hand, we observe a greater
orientation-specific effect only on the Displace sub-movement.
This result is consistent with previous data from Allami et al.
(2008).
Our aim, based on Hari and Kujala’s (2009) model, was
to demonstrate the establishment of a common representation
during a joint action. Through the first condition, the two
subjects were performing the task freely. Even if Condition 1
was uncomfortable for the participant placing the parallelepiped
(S2), the participant placing the base (S1) didn’t change the
base’s orientation to facilitate S2 contribution. Nonetheless, after
both subjects experienced each other’s role in the action (in
Condition 2), a significant change in the base’s orientation has
been measured, revealing a change in the behavior of S1 during
Condition 3. This change also improved the task performance
in Displace sub-movement of S2. Changes in opposition axis
orientation are close to those obtained in previous studies
describing easy movements (Frak et al., 2001; Allami et al., 2008).
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FIGURE 3 | Final Angle measures (◦) in Condition 1, Condition 3 and Control. ∗p < 0.05.
As our Control experiment showed, the orientation change is
not due to the requested high speed during Condition 3; indeed,
no change in angle was measured when the roles of both subjects
were not interchanged (Control condition). This change in the
instructions was only to maintain participants focus and avoid
boredom.
From the neural perceptive, parietal and premotor regions
are thought to form the action observation network, also known
as the MNS (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Although action
mirroring has become a popular way to explain joint action
effects (Frischen et al., 2009), if we adhere to the original
description of this neural substrate, both action and observation
should activate the same neurons. However, in our experiment,
observation of S2’s action did not seem enough for S1 to fully
understand their difficulty. In fact, S1 kept putting the base in a
difficult position for S2 through all Condition 1. However, when
S1 had experience of both parts of the joint-action, S1 adapted
and changed their initial behavior to facilitate S2’s movement. We
can agree here that MN were certainly activated to understand
globally the action but not the subtleties such as extreme joint
angles. The critical behavioral change only appeared in Condition
3, when both subjects shared a common knowledge of the two
individual actions composing the joint action. In any case, our
experiment stirs up a debate about MNS role in joint-actions.
While we do not deny the possible role of MN for joint action, or
the fact that they are involved in action comprehension, it seems
that observation of the partner’s movements (and thus activity
in the MNS) was not enough to fully understand the action of
others (Kokal and Keysers, 2010) during our protocol. In fact, we
highlighted a delayed installation of a common understanding
between the two subjects participating in a joint action. Our
interpretation of behavioral data is in line with Pacherie and
Dokic (2006) minimalist theory.
Over the last few decades, scientific research has improved our
understanding of how perception and action are linked. It still
remains unclear whether the processing of relevant information
during joint actions emerges from the physical and informational
constraints (Rigoli et al., 2015) or whether it is supported by
high-level representations (social-specific) mechanisms (Sebanz
et al., 2006) or through lower perceptive mechanisms (Dolk
et al., 2011). In other words, is the mental representation of a
partner necessary, and if it is, to what extent does one interacting
individual need to mentally represent the actions of others to
interact with them?
One of the most studied joint tasks is derived from the Simon
task (Simon, 1969) where participants have to respond to the
color of stimuli with both their hands while ignoring their spatial
location (e.g., red with left hand, blue with right hand). The
so-called Simon effect (SE) describes the fact that participants
are faster to answer when the stimulus and the response are
congruent (e.g., use the left hand when the stimulus is presented
of the left of the screen). The SE disappears when participants are
asked to only answer to one stimulus (a go/no-go task) but the
joint Simon effect arises when performed by a pair of participants
(where each participant has a go/no-go task). The joint Simon
task has been used to highlight co-representations during joint
tasks, suggesting the existence of a specific neural mechanism
facilitating social interactions with conspecifics (Tsai and Brass,
2007; Welsh, 2009). An alternative interpretation was proposed
by Dolk et al. (2013), suggested that “social” effects from the
Joint Simon task can be explained by the Theory of Event Coding
(Hommel et al., 2001; Hommel, 2009) and further claimed that
generic sensorimotor regions were the substrate of joint actions
without the need of a co-representation. Another framework
challenging the notion of co-representation during joint action
is the Coordination Dynamics approach where social effects are
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due to motor coordination rather than mental stimulation of a
complementary action (Doneva and Cole, 2014). The findings
of our experiment seem to be contesting the latter theories
(both Theory of Event Coding and Coordination Dynamics),
rather they agree that the common representation of the action
during social interaction is through mental representation. Our
results appear to have a better fit in a top-down explanation:
our behavioral change did not appear automatically through
action observation nor motor coordination between subjects
but only when knowledge of task-specific features was shared
between the two participants. Although our conclusions are
only based on kinematics, the change in the behaviors of
participants seems to fit in the theory of co-representation. Here
we argue that participants lacked knowledge of the others’ specific
action, resulting in a misrepresentation during Condition 1.
It is our belief that, only thanks to the shared experience of
the task during Condition 2, was co-representation achieved,
resulting in an adaptation of interacting subjects’ behaviors in
Condition 3. In our task, the common understanding required
both action perception and self-experienced execution of the
subtasks in order to reach a common understanding through co-
representation. Further experiments focusing on neural activity
will be required in order to highlight the installation of the
co-representation, such as reported modulations of the alpha
rhythm during joint actions (Naeem et al., 2012; Novembre et al.,
2016).
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